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Dealing with stockpiles of surplus ammunition1 re-mains a key challenge for many African countries. In the last 10 years, at least 38 ammunition sites across 
Africa reportedly experienced unplanned explosions, causing 
injury and loss of life as well as significant damage to infra-
structure and the environment.2 Numerous reasons such as 
overstocking, inadequate storage facilities due to insufficient 
resources, inadequate capabilities of storage sites, or simply 
unstable ammunition may be the cause of these unplanned 
detonations. These factors are often exacerbated by person-
nel having a limited knowledge and awareness, or insufficient 
training on relevant subjects such as explosive compatibility 
groups or ammunition life cycles. Regardless of the reasons 
outlined previously, the destruction of surplus and/or dete-
riorating ammunition is required as part of a general physical 
security and stockpile management (PSSM) regime, in par-
ticular to reduce the risk of unplanned explosions at ammu-
nitions sites (UEMS). 
During the past decade the international community pro-
vided substantial funding for surplus destruction activities 
to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this funding 
was primarily used by external implementing agencies to de-
stroy existing stockpiles, rather than equipping the countries 
in which destruction activities are undertaken with the skill 
sets and tools to manage their own destruction programs, 
thus lessening their dependence on foreign expertise. This 
article is therefore meant to encourage donors, implementing 
agencies, and beneficiaries to consider interventions through 
a more locally sustainable lens and involve local parties more 
inclusively in the design and implementation of ammunition 
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(Above) Degraded and dysfunctional ammunition is often stored in munition depots across the continent despite its 
unserviceability. Reasons for the storage of degraded ammunition are due to limited awareness, care, or destruction 
capacities.
All images courtesy of Nikhil Acharya, BICC.
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destruction processes. In order to affect a real change in sur-
plus ammunition management, it is not enough to just deal 
with existing surplus stockpiles; the community needs to en-
sure that partnering countries are able to independently pre-
vent the future buildup of surplus stockpiles. 
This article draws attention to the common procedures and 
practices of implementing agencies, partnering countries, 
and donors, before outlining lessons learned and suggesting 
potential ways of creating more participatory, sustainable, 
surplus-destruction projects across Africa.
ISSUES WITH CURRENT APPROACHES TO 
THE MANAGEMENT AND DESTRUCTION 
OF SURPLUS MUNITION
 The need for local ownership over the management and 
destruction processes of surplus stockpiles of ammunition is 
reflected in myriad reports, international best practice stan-
dards, as well as relevant legal instruments in this field in-
cluding the Bamako Declaration Article 3(iv);3 the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention 
Article 17;4 Kinshasa Convention Article 14; Nairobi 
Protocol Article 80;6 and the Silencing the Guns Continental 
Plan of Action on the Control of Illicit Small Arms and 
Light Weapons. The International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines implicitly call for the development of local capa-
bilities in this area (10.2.5 and 10.2.6),7 and external imple-
menting partners conduct relatively short-term training and 
capacity-building projects. However this often happens in an 
ad hoc manner, depending on the nature, scale, resources of 
the intervention, and strategic priorities of the donors, and is 
not always approached with considerations of long-term sus-
tainability in mind. 
There is a need and desire for the skills and infrastructure 
gaps in this area to be filled by local, national, and region-
al bodies. This is needed in order to address the issue of am-
munition destruction at an early enough stage to prevent the 
build-up of surpluses before they become a security and safety 
threat to the state and civilian population in the surrounding 
areas. For this to occur the capabilities must be developed and 
maintained at the local, national, or regional levels. 
Short-term projects and interventions may fail to address 
related gaps in management and destruction processes out-
side of the narrow timeframe in which the implementing 
agencies operate. These capability gaps stem partly from the 
way in which donors operate. Thorough ammunition-life- 
cycle management is an expensive and time-consuming pro-
cess, thus donors tend to favor short-term projects focusing on 
the destruction of specific stockpiles. As well as limiting the 
possibilities of embedding a national system capable of iden-
tifying and destroying surpluses or degraded ammunition, 
interventions may only focus on parts of the destruction re-
quirements that a country needs. This approach may be driven 
by a number of factors including the issue that implementing 
agencies will follow donor parameters and focus purely on the 
material destruction of ammunition instead of devoting the 
necessary time and expertise to building capacity of the local 
technical staff and decision makers. 
Additionally, countries often request assistance that is lim-
ited to expensive infrastructure or equipment procurement. 
For donors, assistance with actual destruction activities is 
comparatively cheaper; however, capacity development, risk 
awareness education, and the development of locally appli-
cable tools and institutional learning to generate knowledge 
for domestic security agencies are being neglected.7 Although 
the provision of relevant equipment is often a necessary com-
ponent of destruction programs, such equipment is often not 
used or maintained once the intervention from the imple-
menting agency or donor concludes. This in turn decreases 
the likelihood of future funding, as donors question the com-
mitment of the recipient. Countries receiving support should 
therefore not be passively involved in the implementation of 
activities by foreign intervention agencies but must operate in 
true partnership with them by actively taking part in the de-
sign and implementation processes.
These approaches may lead to uneven coverage of destruc-
tion activities, with assistance being concentrated in cer-
tain regions and focusing on specific types of intervention. 
These interventions may be more attractive from a short-term 
“marketing” perspective, producing swift, publicly verifiable 
outputs rather than more anonymous long-term benefits. 
Assistance measures therefore often support physical mea-
sures such as the destruction of surplus ammunition or the 
construction/rehabilitation of ammunition sites in countries 
that are already of interest to the international communi-
ty rather than those with more basic infrastructure or with 
complex bureaucracies. It is therefore the case that funding 
tends to cluster around prominently positioned countries who 
may not be able to absorb the assistance provided while other 
countries with similar or higher demands command less at-
tention and do not receive assistance in overcoming existing 
difficulties relating to surplus destruction. 
The questions of strategic relationships and/or geopolitical 
dynamics also feed into determining which states may benefit 
from intervention support. These points all have the poten-
tial to create a cyclical knock-on effect: countries who do not 
receive support focus less on the very governance issues such 
as ammunition management and capacity that deter donors 
from investing in the first place. Therefore better coordina-
tion is needed between donors and established African insti-
tutions, such as the African Union, the Regional Economic 
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Communities, or regional bodies to avoid duplication and in-
effectiveness of the support provided. Apart from inefficien-
cy, duplication of efforts by different agencies and their donors 
might even hamper progress by creating competition among 
implementing agencies and undermining national ownership.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE INTERVENTIONS 
As discussed, interventions are focused on the destruc-
tion of ammunition through external implementing agents. 
However, this approach may only relieve the burden for a short 
period of time, failing in the longer term to address broader 
questions relating to the material conditions and management 
activities undertaken in the intervention countries. These po-
tential gaps ultimately result in the formation of a dependency 
cycle of ongoing external interventions for ammunition sur-
plus destruction. Therefore in order to lessen the dependence 
of beneficiary states on repeated interventions from exter-
nal donors and to allow states to overcome UEMS caused by 
overcrowded unstable stockpile depots the following changes 
in approach are proposed.
Implementing agencies must work more closely with re-
spective countries in the design and execution of surplus 
destruction programs. Rather than treating surplus de-
struction as an activity in isolation, states and implement-
ing agencies may consider the design and establishment of 
joint, tailored, life-cycle-management systems for ammuni-
tion in accordance with international standards. Using this 
broader approach would involve the inclusion of PSSM into 
Surplus and damaged RPG warheads. These explosives pose a serious 
threat to the lives of storage keepers, military personnel, and 
civilians. By separating and destroying surplus ammunition,  
UEMS can be reduced significantly.
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the national curricula of relevant security forces, the devel-
opment of specific policies relating to management systems, 
as well as the introduction and implementation of functional 
standard operating procedures, all of which are necessary to 
generate functioning surplus munition destruction capabili-
ties. This is crucial, as long-term threat mitigation of surplus 
ammunition can only realistically happen through improv-
ing and streamlining the acquisition, distribution, and dis-
posal processes of ammunition. This has the double benefit of 
reducing both the costs and the risks around surplus stock-
piles, which then require further interventions to resolve. 
Additionally, specialized and explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) capacities and equipment must be acquired in order to 
build in-country capabilities. 
The onus to ensure sustainability cannot solely be the do-
nors’; beneficiary countries must also follow through on the 
commitments they give to donors. Each state has an indi-
vidual obligation to limit the risks and hazards of ammuni-
tion stockpiles, both to personnel working directly on those 
sites as well as civilians living in the surrounding areas. States 
should thus be obliged to report on their own activities in this 
area on a regular and standardized basis and should actively 
seek ways to mitigate potential risks at an early stage, rath-
er than ignoring the issues posed by increasing stockpiles.9 
Reports should be publicly available and aimed at donors, rel-
evant international mechanisms as well as stakeholders and 
implementing agencies.
For countries with capacity and capability issues where it 
may not be possible to develop or maintain EOD or arms and 
ammunition destruction expertise, states should request sup-
port from regional economic communities and regional bod-
ies dealing with these subjects to establish regional pools of 
experts—such as train-the-trainers programs to support 
national surplus management and disposal undertakings. 
Promising examples of the approaches that may be used can 
be drawn from the activities of ECOWAS and the Regional 
Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of 
Africa and Bordering States in their PSSM train-the-trainers 
programs. 
Donor countries and institutions are bound to short-term, 
high-impact timelines. Projects are thus often commissioned 
for only two-to-three years. Sustainable change is, however, 
not achieved in such a short time frame; changing personnel 
and institutional behavior requires time to adjust. Therefore, 
donors should consider committing to selected projects for a 
longer period of time, rather than distributing available fund-
ing across a larger number of countries for shorter periods. In 
order to allow partnering countries to overcome surplus 
stockpiles and the dependency on external actors in driving 
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partnering countries in combating the root causes of surplus 
accumulation. This would decrease the dependency on foreign 
financial resources and capacities, a situation that is clearly in 
the interest of all donors, as financial resources can be chan-
neled into a sustainable solution, rather than a quick fix, thus 
representing more bang for donors (and taxpayers) buck than 
the current situation allows.  
See endnotes page 63
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